Marketing in Confusion: A Response to Dale Tuggy, Part 4

In the previous sections (Part 1, Part 2, Part 3), I asserted, and demonstrated, that the first half of Tuggy’s argument--though technically sound--is not supported by the either the biblical evidence or pre-Christian (ie tanniatic Judaist) interpretation. As a result, it was demonstrated that his conclusion simply didn’t follow and that a new argument, one based on the biblical and historical theological data, needed to be constructed.

This new argument, assembled from the biblical data, presents as so:

1. The God of the Old Testament is Yahweh.

2. The Father is identified as Yahweh.

3. Therefore, the Father is Yahweh, the God of the Old Testament.

The reasoning that I gave for the necessity of reformulating the argument was that, as presented, Tuggy’s argument subjected the identity of the Father to a number of heretical avenues, primarily Gnostic. Similarly, one could argue that unless he could make that firm identification, even Marcionism could approach and welcome his argument.

From a Reformed perspective, the objective of theological argumentation is to clarify “the faith once for all delivered to the saints” and to expose those who “suppress the truth in unrighteousness” in hopes that they might “come to the knowledge of the truth” and so be saved.[1]

Tuggy’s initial argument fails to do any of that, which has me wondering how the rest of his argument will fair.

The Commitments of Orthodoxy

Looking at the second half of his argument we find that he states his fourth premise as, “God just is the Trinity”. In defense of this premise, Tuggy writes, “It is not directly or clearly asserted anywhere in the Bible, but it is the defining thesis of any trinitarian theology.”

Now, as was noted earlier, the historic definition of the Trinity is,

Within the one Being that is God, there exists eternally three coequal and coeternal Persons, namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.[2]

Now, this definition necessarily conflicts and contradicts his already assumed definition of “God”, which is derived from the conclusion of the first half of his argument, that “God just is the Father”. So contradictory are these two definitions that the first premise could essentially be affirmed by Oneness unitarians, like David Bernard, who writes, 

Jesus is not another God or a part of God, He is the God of the Old Testament robed in flesh. He is the Father…[3]

Now, I’m certain that Tuggy doesn’t want someone who disagrees with his theological position to be able to affirm any conclusion that he might draw and be able to use it against him by reading their own chosen definitions into his terms. But let’s not also forget that the biblical definition of “god”, with regard to ontology, is a broad field that must be crossed. Furthermore the Trinitarian definition of “God”, with regard to Yahweh, already recognizes and assumes the categorical distinctions of What and Who.

His fifth premise suffers from this problem of assumptions, assumptions that he says that “any trinitarian is committed”. That commitment being that, “It is not the case that the Trinity just is the Father.”

Indeed, there is something about the statement that violates Trinitarian commitments. That violation is in the equation of the Triune nature of God (ontological category) with the Father (identity category). Indeed, and unambiguously, it is not the contention of Trinitarian belief that the Trinity just is the Father. The Trinity is the recognition that the singular divine essence is shared, from eternity and equally, by the Persons. It is not the Father who is Triune but God (ie Yahweh) who is Triune.

Tuggy seems to have some grasp of this as he notes that, “The Trinity is supposed to have the Father as one of its three ‘Persons,’ but the Father is not supposed to have the Father as one of its three ‘Persons.’”

 As is noted, Tuggy--due to his unitarian prior commitments--always and unquestioningly conflates “God” as a category of being or, from the biblical perspective, with the God of Israel, as a circumlocution for the divine name, with the Person of “the Father”. In effect, he refuses to see “the Trinity” as a description of the Being and Nature of God ontologically, but as something external to God.

His conclusion is pregnant with those confused assumptions: “The Trinity just is the Father”. What’s most fascinating about this conclusion is that the negation present in the fourth premise has disappeared.

Moreover, when we compare this with the prior Scriptural evidence where Jesus and the Spirit are identified as Yahweh, then it requires us to form new biblical premises. So, what would those premises be: 

4. The God of the New Testament is identified as Yahweh.

5. The three Persons of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are identified as Yahweh.

6. Therefore Yahweh is tri-personal.

What do these premises maintain?

First, the continuity of the God identified in the Old Testament with the New. Second, it recognizes that there is a continuous and conscious and comfortable identification of the Persons not with Yahweh--as if they were subordinates--but as Yahweh, continuing that Old Testament identification of multiple-Yahwehs, one God with multiple, independent manifestations. Finally, it holds against later heretical movements that either denied the humanity of the Son, the identity of the Father, or the personhood of the Spirit, or the conflation of the Persons. In effect, the argument makes full use of and accounts for all of the biblical evidence without the need to multiply entities. Furthermore, this counter-argument isn’t dependent upon any external pre-commitments, but is contiguous with the long-established second temple beliefs about the nature of Yahweh, which were derived from the Old Testament, or Hebrew Scriptures.

The Distinctness of Discernables

One of the many difficulties inherent in the development of biblical doctrine is that there can often be an assumption on the part of the interpreter that they are seeing things clearly, that they are fully of aware of their pre-commitments and prior assumptions, that they have all of the data in front of them.

If one has preemptively decided how they will understand terms, and then assume that everyone defines their terms the same way, they will inevitably run into confusion or contradiction. 

What we have discovered in Tuggy’s argument is that it is built on those very foundations: the assumption of definitions as well as pre-commitments and prior assumptions by failing to establish the categories that the biblical authors appear to necessarily assume so as not to run into contradiction. Rather, Tuggy has constructed an argument that forces someone who may--out of conditional ignorance--agree with the premises, as he writes,

In sum, we start with uncontroversial contents of scriptural teaching. (1-3) We add in two unavoidable commitments of any trinitarian theology, any Trinity theory (4-5). But these things imply a formal contradiction (5 & 6).

 

However, as was noted, his primary argument--contrary to the claim that they reflect “uncontroversial contents of scriptural teaching”--instead leave the door open for any number of heresies--indeed he would consider them as such--to enter with full agreement. His subsequent argument, contrary to his assertion, only gave any knowledgeable Trinitarian a single commitment: that it is not the case that the Trinity is just the Father.

The truth of this premise alone turns Tuggy’s whole argument on its head.

For Part 5

Notes

1. Jude 3; Romans 1:18; 1 Timothy 2:4, ESV

2. James R. White. The Forgotten Trinity, Revised Edition. Bethany House Publishing. 2019. p. 30 (ePub)

3. David K. Bernard. The Oneness of God, Volume 1. Word Aflame Press. 1983. p. 59, emphasis added