The Fallacy of the Meager Moral Fruits Argument

 Introduction 

An argument that is gaining popularity among the more intellectual atheists is what is known as the Meager Moral Fruits Argument (MMFA).

The general thrust of the argument is that a religion that is TRUE should have some empirical measure that generally establishes this as true, as Emerson Green has put it in terms of Christianity,

If Christianity is the one true religion, its members should be relatively morally superior to those in other religions as well as non-believers.

Indeed that seems to be a somewhat reasonable assumption.

The argument has been developed by philosopher Paul Draper of UC-Irvine and has been picked up by a number of philosophically minded atheists, like Emerson. And, like I said, if we are going to consider whether or not its a meaningful argument against Christian theism there are some point that are due for examination.

I am not overly impressed by moral arguments or arguments that deal with evil for a number of reasons. But this argument, at least from a Reformed Christian perspective, specifically a Reformed theological perspective requires some examination.

As I noted, if we are looking at the effect of a religion, from a purely empirical viewpoint, then we should be able to see some measurable effect, either positively or negatively. But that would seem to assume something about religion that I believe—from a philosophy of religion perspective—simply does not necessarily follow.

As Green notes,

All parties involved—atheists, agnostics, Christians, those in other religions—are roughly equally virtuous.

That is, by and large, when we look across a religious perspectives, we could see that all parties are generally equally moral, and generally have the same values or moral perspectives. 

But that would seem to assume that what makes a person “morally virtuous” is their religious affiliation and not some other element.

Again, Emerson, going along the track asks hard questions of Christians,

Why is church history so appalling, right up into the present? Why are there evils, great and small, committed by believers with such frequency?

The answer to some atheists is obvious, but then theists could simply turn the question around on atheists with regard to the millions upon millions who had been slaughtered in the pursuit of an atheistic utopia in the Soviet Union, Communist China and North Korea?

Remember, you can’t walk without both shoes on. But most people aren’t that consistent in their thinking.

Emerson continues,

If Christians were notably better than non-believers and those in other religions, that would be evidence favoring Christianity. But we don’t see that.

We don’t? We don’t see the thousands of hospitals that exist because of Christianity? We don’t see the orphanages that were established by Christians to take in children who were despised, disposed of, and abandoned by families? We don’t see that just about wherever Christians have gone in the world there has been a substantial improvement not only in the lives of the people there in material terms but also in terms of justice?

Now, undoubtably, the problem that Emerson and so many like him, because of their self-imposed blindness, is that they look around—living in a culture that is, by-and-large, overwhelmingly Christian—and see no difference between themselves and Christians in moral terms.

They see the effects of Christianity—the moral fruits that allow for a prosperous society—and like so many city dwellers that are disconnected from the sources of their sustenance and fail to recognize its source.

As one has noted in an examination of atheism as religion, religion is not the source of morality, it is the car that carries morality. Religion is merely the conveyance of moral concerns and justifications. It is the truck that carries the seed, it is not the field from which the fruit is harvested.

If seed is planted in bad ground, it will not grow. If it is planted in good ground it will grow to abundance.

The question is, where does the seed of morality come from?

With that question in mind, we turn to a more recent post from Emerson that rehashes the argument somewhat but is directly targeted at Christianity.

Frying Pan or Fire

Green begins his post by asking a few questions,

Does Christianity bear the kinds of moral fruit one might expect if it were true? Does naturalism or Christian theism better predict the moral fruits and lack thereof that we actually observe?

Now, these questions appear honest and straightforward, but I would contend that they are not, in fact, remembering the question that closed the previous section we need to again ask the question, if the ground from which the fruit is yielded is in question, from whence comes the seed?

That question is one that no one seems to want to answer in these pursuits. 

If you’re going to ask about the ground that bears the fruit, then you must ask about the seed that is going into it.

Another way to ask the question is the rather straightforward question of, what is moral and how do you know it?

The question that Emerson is asking presupposes a standard by which to judge actions (ie moral fruits). The question that the thinking Christian needs to ask is, what is the standard that is being assumed?

Emerson says,

A given meager moral fruits argument may invoke the fact that Christian practice is often an obstacle to pursuing the good for oneself and others. Its focus may be Christian history, objectionable moral doctrines, social policies, and political influence of Christian institutions. What you’d like to focus on is a matter of choice. (emphasis added)

Notice that this begs the question, what is “good for oneself and others” and how do you know it?

Emerson sets out to frame the MMFA along three related premises: theological, empirical, and a moral. 

Of these he says that, theologically, that if Christianity were true “Christianity should bear moral fruit.” This becomes his testable premise.

The empirical premise, he says, sets out, “to establish some relevant fact about the world.” The example that he gives is that Christianity has held to certain historical mores about human sexuality and gender expression. So, we can see where this is going in regard to the final premise, the moral premise, in which he writes,

…affirms a moral fact or normative judgment. (For example, “LGBT equality would be a moral good.”)

What’s the problem with the moral premise? He assumes it’s truthfulness. But on what grounds?

But, let’s just swap the premise to Islam for a moment, which assumes a “moral fact or judgement” that it’s good to throw LGBT-identified individuals off the top of ten story buildings.

If you’re thinking through these arguments then you notice that there’s a number of hidden and unjustified premises in the background of the argument, which the simple substitution of contextual premises exposes, namely vicious circularity, by assuming that the moral premise is true and that somehow serves as evidence against the theological premise.

However, if one separates the moral premise from the consideration and looks at them in moral terms themselves, the problem is exposed: equality or inducing a ten-story fall? Which do you choose? Why? Is there a third, forth, or fifth option?

Until the person making the argument can provide a coherent justification for drawing a particular moral conclusion the meager moral fruits argument is just another weak attempt by unbelievers to suppress the knowledge of God within themselves.

The Christian would argue that atheism has produced a meager moral fruit of sexual licentiousness in its uncritical acceptance of that which is in rebellion against nature (ie homosexuality and transgenderism) and that fruit is poisonous as it is consumed producing even worse things like a movement to accept pedophilia.

Now, I’m certain that atheists like Emerson are appalled by and oppose those who would use children sexually, but there are those who are increasingly accepting of the practice and will use that same against Emerson’s moral judgement.

But on what grounds can he oppose them? 

Consent? Who says that “consent” (ie consensus) makes something moral? If consensus is all that matters then gang rape is moral, sense there are more consenting than not.

“Well, children can’t consent.”

Who says?

“The law.”

Well, we can change the law and lower the age of consent.

Emerson again,

On naturalism, we would expect religion, like all other man-made institutions, to be sometimes a help in the pursuit of the good, sometimes a hindrance.

 

The question that must be answered: What is “good” and how do you know it?

That is not a question that naturalism can answer, but Christian theism conveys that answer, an answer that was given long ago to the prophets of God, and is given to us in Scripture, if we are wise enough to turn to it.